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Abstract: 
 
Science is a winner-take-all profession in which only few contributions get excessive attention and the large 
majority of papers remains receives scant or no attention. This so-called ‘waste’ together with all the competitive 
strategies of scientists seeking attention is part and parcel of any creative profession and not a worrisome fact as 
the price society pays for human ingenuity is extremely small: 0.0006 percent of world income goes into the 
publication of scientific research. The more worrisome features of competition in academic economics reveal 
themselves not through ordinary citation or publication statistics or competitive attention seeking strategies. The 
badly designed use of market principles in which citations and publications have become the sole measuring rod 
of scientific ‘productivity’ deserve more attention instead of the excessive focus of attention on uncitedness as 
such. 
   1
1. Introduction 
 
In 1991 the journal Science made the headlines with a bibliometric exercise that suggested the 
wastefulness of scientific research.1 It showed that about half the science papers was never 
cited within the 5 years time span after publication, a result that spurred Newsweek to 
conclude that “nearly half the scientific work in this country is worthless” and to depict 
“scientists with their belief in their God-given right to tax-payer dollars” as “welfare queens 
in white coats.” (April 2, 1991) Later on the figures were corrected for some anomalies but 
the blow to the outside world stood.2  The suspicion of waste in scientific research was 
affirmed. Recently, Laband and Tollison (2003) have done a similar exercise for the 
economics profession and they show that, in spite of the growth of resources between 1974 
and 1996 invested in academic research, the percentage of uncited papers in economics has 
remained more or less constant at 26 percent. In their view this is evidence of scientific waste 
or ‘dry holes’ as they dub them. “Scholarly economic research presents many of the 
characteristics of a rent-seeking game (p. 168),” was their conclusion. 
Laband and Tollison are, of course, not the only ones to worry about the value of 
scientific research.3 Scientists experience this supposed wastefulness of their practice in the 
battle for attention. They know how difficult it is to get their research published, and even 
more difficult to get it published in a good journal; and they know that even when a paper gets 
published, the chance of it getting read and cited is pretty slim. Scientists may want to believe 
that they are making claims to the truth, but the truth is that those claims often go unnoticed.  
It is an iron law that most articles receive few or no citations and only a few articles receive a 
great many (Klamer and Van Dalen, 2002). This law is the frustration of practicing scientists 
and may come as a shock to those interested in and funding scientific research. But before 
concluding that scientific research involves a great deal of waste or that doing science is 
senseless if the work is not noticed, we may want to reconsider the practice of science to 
understand why this so-called waste occurs.  It may be inevitable. And it may well be that the 
real waste shows up in a different guise, which citation and publication data will not easily 
detect. 
                                                                 
1 See Hamilton (1990, 1991). 
2 Later on the ISI by means of a letter by David Pendlebury in Science (March 22, 1991) corrected these figures, 
as the initial figures included journal marginalia (book reviews, letters, editorials). The corrected uncitedness 
figures for physical sciences are 22% (initially 47%), social sciences 48% (initially 75%) and the humanities 
93% (initially 98%). 
3 Mayer (2004) shows some of the pitfalls of citation statistics as arranged by Laband and Tollison.   2 
 
2. Some Facts of ‘Waste’ 
So how bad is the state of the scientific publication industry? What are the facts? The 
outstanding feature of scientific publication and citation behavior is the skewness, not only in 
publication productivity of scientists, but in particular the citations these publications and 
their authors receive: most articles receive few or no citations and a few receive a great many. 
The median article in a science journal has a negligible influence on the literature, only the 
top 5 or 10 percent of the science literature matters, i.e. it gets read and is cited by peers. 
Generally these top journals represent the core of a discipline; journals which have a wide 
circulation, extensive peer review and are managed by people who have made their mark and 
who can recognize high quality or high impact papers (although their choices are, of course, 
not flawless). The type of skewness may be a sign of competitiveness within a science: the 
more skewed the distribution of attention is the larger the pay-off to risky research and in that 
respect Table 1 gives us a flavor of the differences among sciences. 
Competition in the natural sciences is not only revealed by the number of journals and 
articles appearing, the core journals in the sciences also take up a larger share of the ongoing 
conversation, even more so if you correct for the impact which the average article in journals 
have had for the past two years. E.g., the top 10 percent of highly cited medicine journals 
produce 27 percent of all the articles in the medicine profession and if you correct for the 
impact of these articles the top 10-percent of medicine articles accounts for 75 percent of the 
‘conversation’ in this discipline. 
The differences across disciplines are to a degree the reflection of different citation 
practices: medicine and psychology journals are far more efficient in handling manuscripts 
than most social science journals (Elison, 2002a, 2002b). By shortening turnaround times 
from submission to date of publication one can establish that the immediacy of impact is 
larger. These differences notwithstanding, the skewness of the distribution of citations is a 
fact for all of them; and each discipline knows the phenomena of large share of the published 
papers that get never cited.  
However, the conclusion that all the uncited work is ‘waste’ and therefore should not 
be funded is unwarranted. It is as misguided as the conclusion that most of the play during a 
football game is waste because it does not produce a score. Imagine that the players would 
have to limit themselves to playing the highlights only! Movie producers cannot limit 
themselves to the production of blockbusters. Apparently, scores and hits have to occur in the 
company of many hapless moments and efforts, such as uncited and unsuccessful research.      3 
 
 
Table 1: Size and distribution of publications in a number of sciences and social 
sciences, 2002* 
Discipline  #journals  # articles published 
in journals 
% articles published by 
top-10 % journals
a 
Idem % articles 
published in top-10 % 
journals weighted by 
impact factor 
Science  5,876  716,304     
     Biology/biotechnology  193  18,279  30.3  51.8 
     Chemistry  418  85,530  40.4  64.0 
     Computer Science  338  19,739  30.0  50.6 
     Mathematics  329  22,998  22.5  33.4 
     Medicine  183  20,883  26.7  74.5 
     Physics  267  85,718  46.9  69.6 
Social Sciences  1,709  64,039     
     Anthropology  53  1,491  28.3  41.4 
     Economics  166  7,081  9.3  24.8 
     Educational research  116  3,572  12.0  29.1 
     Law  102  2,719  12.3  33.5 
     Political Science  80  2,995  14.5  28.1 
     Psychiatry  78  4,735  28.3  56.4 
     Psychology  422  16,759  27.1  45.9 
     Sociology  93  2,550  13.2  33.7 
 
* There is some overlap between the journals of the sciences and the social sciences and the disciplines within 
these sciences hence the total number of journals of the ISI database is smaller than the sum of science and social 
science journals. 
(a) Selection of the top 10 percent of the journals is based on total number of citations received by a journal in 
the year 2002. 
Source: Institute for Scientific Information, 2003, Journal Citation Reports, as reported in Web of Science, 
Philadelphia. 
 
 
The discussion may improve if the participants were to understand the skewed distribution of 
citations.4 Here is a likely explanation. The extreme skewed distribution of citations, we 
argue, is part and parcel of what we will call the attention game in science (Klamer and Van 
Dalen, 2002). Science is a creative profession in which all participants both look for attention, 
                                                                 
4 An extra reason why differences in citation rates and levels of uncitedness between sciences exist is the 
difference in citation practices. It takes, for instance, far more years before a publication is recognized in the 
social sciences such as sociology and economics, than an idea is recognized in medicine or chemistry (cf. 
Hargens, 2000, and Van Dalen and Henkens, 2004).   4 
for their work that is, and need to pay attention to the work of others (to keep up with what is 
going on).  The problem is the excess: there are far too many articles for any scientist to pay 
attention to, let alone to read. The Renaissance scholar, who covered a great variety of fields, 
is inconceivable nowadays. Everybody has to make a selection and will usually follow others 
in doing so. (We leave out the screening that takes place before publication; that process only 
amplifies the skewed outcome). One scientist reads an article because others cite it; by citing 
it in her own work, others may turn to the article as well. And so the snowball continues 
squashing all kinds of other articles on its path. This outcome of the attention game reflects 
what the sociologist of science Robert Merton has called the Matthew effect of science-- those 
who have will receive –and is consistent with what economists depict as a winner-take-all 
profession (Frank and Cook, 1995). As in the attention games in the movie and book 
publishing industries as well as in the arts, the amount of attention paid to scientific work and 
recognition received is highly skewed towards the ‘lucky’ few. The superstars receive 
excessive attention whereas the starlets and the rank-and-file receive little or none.  
In view of the odds, participation in this attention game is a gamble: the risk is great 
that one’s work goes unnoticed and uncited yet if one article happens to catch the attention, 
the rewards in terms of reputation, invitations to conferences and possibly promotion are 
great. The speculative character of the game continues to affect even the stars. They may 
continue to publish but continued attention after a hit is far from guaranteed. You would say 
that they are guaranteed ample attention but even they run the risk to have their work ignored.  
Nobel prizes are usually awarded for work done early in the career. The critic might argue 
that funding should be halted after that first success, as the chance at another success is small; 
the remainder of the work is waste. Yet, who will tell? Like the dull moments in a game, 
‘waste’ is an inevitable part of creative work. Eliminate waste and you eliminate the chance at 
the rare outstanding work. 
Skewness implies the phenomenon of stars. We know from the economics of 
superstars (Rosen, 1981) that superstars are characterized by (1) a close connection between 
personal reward and the size of one’s own market; and  (2), a strong tendency for both market 
size and reward to be skewed toward the most talented people in the activity.  Large markets 
are like science prizes; they stimulate the search for new territory.  Social scientists like 
sociologists and economists have to be satisfied with far smaller markets than people working 
in chemistry and physics, and therefore are engaged as much in priority races. In physics and 
medicine priority in discovery is on every scientist’s mind because the prize of recognition is 
large.   5
4. The Cost of a Common Good – Science 
The infatuation with citation figures of deans and policy makers and the concomitant question 
of why so many articles are never cited will remain at the forefront of the policy debate as the 
flood of publications will increase in the age of electronic publishing and therewith the 
number of anonymous authors who fail to catch a glimmer of the limelight. Policymakers 
tend to turn skeptical when they find out about this so-called waste in scientific research.  
Why should they allocate scarce tax dollars to finance such a waste? But the costs of such a 
waste is minimal especially when we consider that scientific research is in principle a game 
without geographical borders: After all, most of the research gets communicated in 
international journals with English as the lingua franca. Science is therefore not a national but 
a global affair. Stiglitz (1999) has stated more than once that research produced by scientists 
is a global public good and should also be treated as such. Whether this argument will help to 
win votes for the budgets of national science foundations is questionable, but it helps us 
putting the publishing game in the appropriate perspective. 
To make our case let’s assume that there is one gigantic decision maker who finances 
research and who is quite sympathetic to the scientist’s fate and who couldn’t care less 
whether the publications produced by the numerous scientists are cited or not. Sooner or later 
ideas will pop up and among those ideas there will be an excellent idea that saves costs, lives 
or time to calculate another excellent idea. The only concern this decision maker has is that 
ideas are produced, communicated and brought out in the open as soon as possible. That is the 
entire idea of the publishing game in science. It is a tournament in which being the first to 
publish a report is the scientist’s only prize worth having, in return society receives 
knowledge. Now what should this publishing game cost the average tax payer: 10 percent of 
national income, 1 percent, 1/1000 of a percentage point or even less than this small fraction? 
Applying some back-of-the-envelope accounting one can easily show that the publishing 
game is not at all a worrisome institution. For purposes of making this numerical claim we 
will define scientific research as all knowledge codified and disclosed in journals registered 
by the ISI in the science citation index (SCI) and the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI). 
The cost of producing one article covers a large number of inputs, like the monetary value of 
time it takes the author to produce a paper, the time editors and referees put into evaluating 
the merit of publishing the paper and then there are the costs the publisher has to incur like 
printing, copy-editing, marketing and last but not least the mark-up to make publishing a 
profitable business. The direct costs incurred by publishing firms and reflected in serial prices 
attract the most attention in discussions on the serial crisis or the publishing crisis. Estimates   6 
of direct costs based on a sample of mathematics and engineering journals fall in the range of 
$1000 to $8000 per article. But direct costs are by and large dwarfed by the indirect costs of 
which the costs of preparing a paper must surely be the largest category. Tentative estimates 
arrive at the amount of $32,000 per article of which $20,000 is imputed to the author’s cost of 
preparing a paper, $8,000 for library costs and $4,000 for editorial and refereeing costs 
(Odlyzko, 1997). The total number of articles published in the 7,500 research journals in the 
sciences and social sciences amounts to 762,000 multiplied by the all inclusive cost per article 
of $40,000 - taking the most conservative estimate of the direct costs into account - and one 
arrives at the grand total bill of codified science of $30.5 billion. To keep in line with the 
earlier arrived principle that science is a global affair one should relate this number to the 
world income and in doing so the publishing game of science seems to be a cheap affair as 
0.0006 percent of world income of 2002 (48,443 billion US$ at purchasing power parities, 
source IMF) is allocated on making scientific knowledge public. 
Sure enough, the ISI journals are only the tip of the iceberg of science journals: 
according to Ulrich’s International Serials Database there are currently (issue 2004) about 
250,000 journals being published of which 21,000 are refereed. If we take the latter group as 
the boundary set and we assume that these journals publish more or less the same amount of 
articles as the journals registered by ISI then we should multiply the science cost figure by a 
factor 2.8. In other words, the corrected price of publishing scientific findings is 0.0018 
percent of world GDP. That makes science not an entirely free lunch, but it certainly is a 
cheap lunch. 
 
4. Competitive strategies of attention seekers 
Even if the supposed waste of scientific research does not add up to large monetary amounts, 
practicing scientists continue to have to live with the harsh facts of the attention game in 
which they are involved. ‘How to survive in the game and emerge with some recognition?’ 
seems to be on the mind of every modern-day scholar. Edward Leamer (1981) gives us a hint 
of what kind of strategies scientists could follow or actually do follow to gain attention. 
 
“Many of you will conjure up reasons why the number of citations should be ignored. There are 
fads; there are self-citations; there are conspiracies; there are derogatory citations; there are bribes 
to editors and referees; there are sycophantic students; and there are subjects capable of direct 
understanding by only a few. But why didn’t your paper start fads; why don’t you publish more 
and cite yourself; why did your conspiracies fail; why don’t you become an editor; why don’t your 
students care about your welfare; and why don’t you insist on writing about obscure issues?”  
   7
The ultimate question is of course: do these strategies distort the conversation in science in a 
significant manner or is this simply the way the world of science works and it may well be 
working fine? Let’s consider the most important strategies that Leamer cites and evaluate 
their alleged distortionary nature for a science that is close to home: economics. 
 
Starting fads 
Starting a fad is much frowned upon by academics, but let’s face it, it involves a special talent 
to make a subject the ‘talk of the town’. Stigler (1955: 6) also considers this possibility and 
points out that a fad will only make “a deep and lasting impression on the science if the idea 
meets the durable standards of the science.” To make an idea stick it is not sufficient to be 
original, salesmanship has to accompany the process of invention. Stigler takes the case of 
John Stuart Mill as exemplary for an original mind who did not sell his ideas persuasively or 
accompany his written thoughts by salesmanship and for that reason has not become truly 
path-breaking. 
The most common strategy to gain attention from peers and get the ball rolling is 
simply by ‘advertising’. In writing on the technique of persuasion George Stigler (1955) states 
that new ideas are even harder to than new products: “Wares must be shouted – the human 
mind is not a divining rod that quivers over truth.” General repetition, inflated claims and 
disproportionate emphases are according to Stigler the strategies that accompany the adoption 
of every new idea in economic theory. The techniques of persuasion have not lost their touch 
as Figure 1 below shows: in trying to attract attention to papers in the economics literature: in 
trying to rise above the enormity of papers being published an increasing number of 
economists grabs the browsers attention by promising new paradigms, new theories or new 
perspectives in the title of their paper. Over the years, there have been apparently more 
breakthroughs or more paradigm shifts in economics than philosophers ever could have 
imagined. Of course, such claims are inflated5 and scientific practice corrected for such 
inflation behaves far less progressive than the attention grabbing words suggest. 
 
 
                                                                 
5  See for an earlier evaluation of the use of inflated claims Cohen (1999), who notices that 90 percent of the 
‘new paradigm’ papers affect the research world very little.   8 
Figure 1: Inflated claims - attention grabbing title words in economic literature, 1969-
2003 
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Source: Econlit (2004) 
 
 
Salesmanship is just as important in grabbing attention as the scientific quality of a work. In 
that respect scientists can learn a bit from ordinary businessmen who value both Research and 
Development whereas scientists give the impression that the R of research is all that matters. 
The tenacity of door-to-door salesman has to be part of the make-up of a scientist and 
advertising for your own work (by self-citation, by brainwashing your students or by 
organising workshops and conferences) are legitimate efforts. The scholar who successfully 
sells his or her ideas is in the words of Stigler “more a warrior against ignorance than a 
scholar among ideas.” According to the Institute for Scientific Information approximately 20 
percent of all citations are self-citations. 
 
Publish, publish…or perish 
One condition of getting recognized is the academic status of the researcher. Hundred years 
ago, and back, men of practical affairs who were almost on an equal footing with academic 
scholars when it came to publishing research (Stigler et al., 1995).  Their articles appeared 
regularly in the academic journals. Nowadays, academic credentials are a prerequisite for the 
right to get published in an academic journal. Gentlemen researchers do not stand a chance in   9 
the current game for attention. Even academics that venture out in the non-academic world, 
like in the government bureaucracy or in a research department of a private organization see 
their chances for academic publication seriously diminish. Publications of non-academically 
occupied economists in star journals like the American Economic Review are rare, whereas in 
the distant past the appearance of practitioners was more common phenomenon. The 
dominant player in the production of ideas is the Academic Professional (Klamer and 
Colander, 1990). Graduate training tells the students that the only chance they have to make it 
in the academic attention game is an academic job at a top university.  As an Academic 
Professional their lives will focus on academic life with its academic conferences, research 
seminars, socializing with other academics, and endless hours in the office. Such life does not 
guarantee citations but it is the only chance. 
Late bloomers make little chance in this game.  Educational institutions put a premium 
on relatively early manifestations of ability.  In making decisions on who is to become a 
member universities are increasingly relying on publication and citation records (Hargens and 
Schuman, 1990) and indicators of future productivity, such as the time required for 
completing the doctorate. Merton (1988: 614) may warn against the pitfalls of such a practice, 
but academic institutions do not want to take chances with the late bloomers. 
Graduate students adopt the behaviour of their teachers. Zuckerman (1977) shows in 
her survey of US Nobel laureates how students of eminent and prolific scientists in general 
are also prolific writers. Graduate training generally proves to be decisive for the novice 
academic professional. As Buchmüller et al. (1999) demonstrate publications and submissions 
prior to leaving graduate school increase the probability of being employed at a research 
university where productivity is higher. And so the ball starts rolling. The question of course, 
is whether this character trait is acquired or already apparent and merely cultivated by the 
supervisor. According to Van Ours and Ridder (2003) who examined the PhD completion 
records of Dutch graduates in economics, the research productivity of the supervisor is an 
important determinant of completion and dropout rates of graduates. However, the apparent 
effect of the research track record of supervisors on the completion rates is due to the 
selection or attraction of high ability students and not to superior supervision. 
 
‘Conspiracy’ - create your own club 
The most enduring strategy to make the process of gaining, distributing and sharing attention 
manageable is to create clusters. Scientists specialise and form clusters in their specialisation,   10
each with its own ‘discursive practice’ or ‘conversation’, its own journal and association and 
annual conference. Clustering is a condition for making the process of attention seeking and 
getting more manageable. The downsizing of clusters has proven to be an effective response 
to the inflation of research publications. It enables all kinds of selection procedures without 
which the world of science would not be able to function. The connection with the 
phenomenon of ‘stars’ is obvious. We suspect that the larger the cluster, the more space there 
is, and need, for the creation of stars, charismatic leaders who bring order out of chaos. The 
reason may be that sustenance of the large cluster (say econometrics or finance) requires a 
core knowledge that all ‘members’ share. The sharing will force a highly skewed distribution 
of attention. Indeed, anyone who has seen his or her share of rankings knows that people like 
Clive Granger or Eugene Fama are in far better position to generate a huge amount of 
citations with a single article than economists working in some esoteric sub-discipline. 
  The idea that clusters of scientists are important for the transmission and generation of 
ideas goes back to Crane’s concept of invisible colleges that dominate the frontiers of science 
(Crane, 1972). Ideas do not consistently come out of the blue, i.e. ideas are not randomly 
scattered around the world. Geographic proximity of great minds matters in the birth of ideas.  
This is clearly illustrated in the dominance of a few institutions that have attracted Nobel 
laureates, the University of Chicago being of course the champion attractor of Nobel 
economists (see Van Dalen,1999). The main importance of clusters is that they set the 
standard of conversation, they frame the questions of interest, select the conversation or 
sparring partners and they test the robustness of ideas in debate. Naturally it is of some 
importance to win a debate because influencing one big giant is worth far more at the 
invention stage than influencing ten dwarfs who may perhaps give you their promise they will 
cite you but whose papers rarely get published and certainly not in core journals. Or look at it 
in another way: not only do giants generally form a better testing ground they are also prolific 
writers of high impact articles in which they cite the proposed idea. To see how this works out 
in practice take a look at Figure 2 which illustrates the ‘applause’ generated by Paul Romer’s 
article on  “Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth” in the Journal of Political Economy of 
1986. Romer had just finished his PhD thesis and this article was his very first article. A 
striking characteristic of the total number of citations is that increasing returns applies not 
only to the content of the article but very much to the attention generated for a very long 
stretch in the lifetime of this particular article. Ten years after the publication date the number 
of citations settle at around 118. However, the most striking aspect of the attention generated 
by Romer is to be found in the role played by economists belonging to the core or their   11 
profession and the core journals. The first three to four years after the publication of the JPE 
article the core economists and core journals generate almost single-handedly the attention, 
after six or seven years the economists publishing in second tier journals take over, which is 
also not so difficult to understand: not only did these second-tier economists had to forego the 
first-mover advantage which the ‘invisible college’ economists had, they are generally not so 
prolific and skilled in getting papers published. When the followers catch on, the innovators 
in the publication process have already moved on and lost interest in the initial paper, in the 
last three years a meagre 5 percent of the citations to the Romer-paper come from top 
economists, in contrast to the very beginning of the paper’s career when 90 percent of the 
citations were generated by the ‘core’ economists. 
 
Figure 2: Citations generated by Romer’s Increasing Return Article, 1986-2000 
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5. Searching for the real ‘waste’ 
Starting fads, publish or perish and starting your own club are strategies that are ‘all in the 
game’. Economics teaches us that there is always another side to a story. Economics is about 
trade-offs and seeking attention relentlessly by each and every one participant has its price. 
The strategy of Stigler to advertise with the zest of a used-car salesman has the drawback that 
words loose their meaning, or to rephrase this for the subject at hand: Inflated claims inflate 
your reputation and your ideas. But…. as rational expectations teaches us that we can (in 
principle) see through the veil of money we should also be able to see through inflated claims. 
However, just like money illusion exists in everyday life we have to doubt the ability of 
participants to see through the veil of the academic coin. Inflated claims in science will 
thereby affect real behaviour of the community of scientists. This is perhaps seen in its most 
eminent form in the work of new classical economists. A telling anecdote is perhaps the 
following made by Robert Lucas (2001). He and his co-author Leonard Rapping were joking 
at a social occasion about a remark made by Edmund Phelps in the introduction to the book 
Microeconomic Foundations of Employment and Inflation Theory. Phelps stated that “…. 
perhaps Lucas and Rapping are 180 degrees to the truth.”, and Lucas and Rapping, being 
young academics and elated for being cited for the first time in an important volume, found 
this an amusing statement. However, Rapping’s wife who was also present when they 
chuckled over Phelps’ remark, was shocked and said: 
 
“All you two care about is being cited by a well-known economist, about being famous. It doesn’t 
matter to you whether you are right or 180 degrees off.” 
 
The search for an explanation the way the world works can easily be substituted by a search 
for fame, period. The difficulty with using citation statistics is that this distinction is lost in 
the translation and the strategies which deans and policy makers design. In that respect, being 
uncited is not necessarily a sign of waste just like receiving many citations is not necessarily a 
sign of a scientific breakthrough. It could be more heat than light. If citation studies are to 
shed light on the practice of economists then at least the following two strategies may be 
worth considering. 
 
Dig deeper… 
Plain citation data can be just as misleading as macroeconomics statistics can tell you the state 
of a nation. Micro-studies and/or longitudinal data have to supplement the quest for the real 
waste. For instance, the Laband and Tollison (2003) study, just like the Science study of 1991   13
uses a five-year period to evaluate the state of ‘waste’. However, there are numerous studies 
which show that each discipline has a different lag structure with which ideas are 
acknowledged and cited (see Hargens, 2000). Furthermore, as Van Dalen and Henkens (2004) 
show the state of uncitedness is not necessarily a good predictor of future uncitedness. In 
other words, negative duration dependence in being cited is not some iron-clad rule. 
To give another example, the age of rational expectations yielded a host of neutrality 
theorems of which the Ricardian equivalence theorem of Robert Barro is perhaps one of the 
most notable statements of this era in the history of economic thought. Figure 3 shows how 
the classical JPE paper on stating the neutrality of public debt has fared over the years.  
 
Figure 3: Citations to the Ricardian equivalence paper of Barro (JPE, 1974)  
 
 
The 1980s were in that respect the high tide; right now the paper is getting citations from by 
and large second and third tier authors. The scientists working on the frontiers of knowledge 
are not that much affected by the Barro-paper. Perhaps this last phenomenon is not that 
exceptional. ‘Obliteration by incorporation’ is the Mertonian phrase and contributions can 
become so fundamental that only meticulous rookies take the pains to cite ‘path-breaking’ 
contributions. However, one can have serious doubts about the ‘obliteration by incorporation’ 
argument just by looking at three other fundamental papers written about the same time as 
Barro’s classic: the paper by Peter Diamond on Public Debt (1965) -comparable in nature, 
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subject and tone to that of Barro - the Dixit-Stiglitz paper on monopolistic competition 
(1977), and the Lemons paper by George Akerlof (see figures 4a-4c). Each of these papers 
displays perhaps the same citation pattern with respect to citations received in core journals or 
core economists (most core economists have lost interest in this issue), but the patterns 
diverge when it comes to the total number of citations. Where the influence of Barro’s paper 
is clearly declining, the other papers display a steady and increasing citation rate. Apparently, 
their contribution is so fundamental that it still inspires many economists or is an essential 
‘stepping stone’ in gaining insights. 
 
Figure 4a: Citations to the Adverse Selection Paper of Akerlof (QJE, 1970) 
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Figure 4b: Citations to the Dixit-Stiglitz Paper on Monopolistic Competition (AER, 
1977) 
 
Figure 4c: Citations to the Paper on Public Debt and Growth by Diamond (AER, 1965) 
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Another example of a problem of ‘waste’ that may be examined by digging deeper is the 
problem of plagiarism. The darker sides of the publish or perish culture become visible once 
scientists are tempted to perform fraudulent acts (like copying research, faking data and 
statistics, intentionally leaving out erroneous findings) or fall prone to unethical behaviour 
that is permitted by peers because the form of conduct has become ‘normal’. Examples of the 
latter are reflected in citation games like not citing the ‘enemy’, the citation of friends and not 
giving credit when credit is due. But it is also apparent in publication strategies like slicing up 
one research in a number of more or less identical papers (the so-called salami tactics) which 
are submitted simultaneously to journals and edited books, putting your name on the list of 
authors (preferably first) without having contributed, leaving out authors (usually assistants or 
PhD students) in the list of contributors who have made a real contribution, etc.6 List et al. 
(2001) provide a peak into unethical behavior. They found a significant amount of misconduct 
among economists, particularly with respect to the expropriation of graduate student research 
or including an undeserving co-author on a research paper.  
 
… and look out of your window 
Another strategy which may supplement the information content of statistics and inform 
policy makers and practitioners to look out of your window and get to know the real world. 
Economists, taking their cue from Milton Friedman’s influential essay on positive economics, 
are not enthused about asking their economic agents what goes on inside their black box. One 
should judge an agent by his actions not by his words is the tacit message economists bring 
across. Preferences do not have to be stated, they will reveal themselves by the deeds of 
agents. The funny thing is that the corner stone of every economist – the benefits of the 
division of labour – was explained by way of recounting the organisation of a pin factory. 
Adam Smith, or - closer to the truth - his teacher Francis Hutcheson who already used the 
example of the pin factory, discovered the use of reality economics. Economists are not very 
interested in their own pin factories and yet it is there that we can really get a feel for what 
‘productivity’ and ‘technical progress’ really is, how it is brought about and how it is 
destroyed. Reality economics or ‘learning by asking’, as Alan Blinder et al. practice in their 
book Asking about Prices (1998) seems to be going through a revival. Of course, there have 
always been economists of name and fame who have always practised this art. Alfred 
Chandler and Ronald Coase are economists that can serve as role models. The basic idea of 
                                                                 
6 Hamermesh (1992) provides the young professional with some sound rules of conduct.   17
reality economics, as we would like to call it, is that it not only offers a source of inspiration 
but primarily a reality check on the way scientific discovery works. ‘Reality economics’ as 
practiced through interviews and surveys may bring more to life what is going on inside a 
science than plain citation or publication statistics. In a series of interviews among economists 
we (Klamer, 1984, Klamer and Colander, 1990, and Van Dalen en Klamer, 1996) have 
sketched a picture of how the world of economists functions, what triggers their curiosity, 
who they respect, what they think makes an economist and what constitutes a persuasive 
argument. This type of research may help to focus on the essential questions which scholars 
face or why the distance between academia and the policy arena diverges by time or by 
culture.  
 
5. Conclusion and Discussion 
Contrary what is often believed, science is on the face of it not a game of wasteful 
competition. Based on statistics alone it is hard to say that public expenditure is being 
squandered, even if most of the research gone goes unnoticed. Our back-of-the-envelope 
calculations suggest that on a global scale the scientific publication industry costs the world 
0.0006 percent of global income. In science and research and development so-called ‘waste’ 
or uncited patents and articles are part and parcel of the act of discovery. For practicing 
scientists this harsh ‘fact of life’ means concretely a scarcity of attention.  The chance of 
catching the attention for your work is slim. The game of attention is unfair as only a few get 
the lion share of all attention. The winner in this game takes almost all. 
However, our message is mixed: there may be ‘waste’ but citation and publication 
statistics are simply scratching at the surface. Exercises such as those of Laband and Tollison 
(2003) trigger a discussion but the figures they present are not conclusive. Like nineteenth 
century economist Frederic Bastiat was wont to stress: economists should try to “see what is 
not seen”. We see a skewed distribution of attention but what lurks behind these citation 
statistics? The so-called ‘waste’ is not the main worry as it may be the very proof of healthy 
competition and the ‘carrot’ for inspiring scholars may be bigger than ever. “An information 
rich world creates a scarcity of attention”, were the words of Herbert Simon (1971) and his 
observation was right on the mark. The more worrisome features of competition in academic 
economics reveal themselves not through ordinary statistics or the competitive attention 
seeking strategies, but the badly designed use of market principles in which citation statistics 
have become the measuring rod in evaluating and rewarding effort in science. Reward 
schedules in economic science fall prone to the classic problem of incentive design:   18
rewarding A (publication) while hoping for B (novel ideas) or badly designed distribution of 
property rights of ideas (Frey, 2003). Perhaps at this point academia should pay close 
attention to how industry deals with innovation. One of the strategies to deal with the 
innovation in winner-take-all markets is to experiment and let a thousand flowers bloom. As 
Scherer and Harhoff (2000) point out for a world of highly skew-distributed outcomes: 
research programs should not be judged by the numerous failures, but the relatively few big 
successes should be emphasized.  
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